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159 
TO INNOVATE OR REGULATE: HOW TO 
REGULATE CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS 
WITHIN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Morgan Willard∗ 
If a person had to use one word to describe the past hundred years, even the 
last fifty years, one word trumps all others: technology. From watches that 
track our every movement to robots in factories, technology is impacting both 
individuals and industries. Financial services is one of the industries that has 
been revolutionized by technological advances. Computers entered the world 
of banking in the 1950s, and by the 1960s began to soar.1 Between 1963 and 
1968, the use of on-premises or off-premises computers “rose from less than 
one-in-ten to almost half” and quickly became paramount to day-to-day 
business.2 In the 1990s, more workers used computers in the financial industry 
than any other, which increased “the number and quality of remote services 
that banks could offer customers[.]”3 From credit cards to online banking, 
                                                          
∗ Morgan Willard is a graduate from the Catholic University of America, Columbus School 
of Law. She is originally from Fairfax, Virginia and graduated from the University of St. 
Andrews with a degree in International Relations. Her heartfelt thanks go out to both her 
parents for their support and for always agreeing to read another draft and to J.C. Boggs 
without whom she would not have known about this topic. Her final thanks go to all the 
friends and colleagues who reviewed and worked on this article to make it the final product 
it is today. 
 
1 See Bank of America Revolutionizes Banking Industry, BANK OF AM., 
https://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/our-story/bank-of-america-revolutionizes-
industry.html#fbid=XEcoEWAMMZ7 (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (explaining how the first 
computer helped Bank of America in the banking industry by introducing Electronic 
Recording Method of Accounting, which could process upwards of 12,000 letters or 
numbers per second). 
 2 HAL S. SCOTT ET AL., PROGRAM ON INT’L FIN. SYS., CLOUD COMPUTING IN THE FIN. 
SECTOR: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (July 2019), https://www.pifsinternational.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/Cloud-Computing-in-the-Financial-Sector_Global-Perspective-
Final_July-2019.pdf. 
 3 Id. 
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technology has improved customer access to financial services and increased 
efficiency in the process overall.4 Technology has been considered to be an 
asset to the financial industry as it provides superior service to as many 
customers as possible. Consumer advocates have appreciated the expansion of 
banking products to underserved groups through increased information on 
potential customers.5 Yet, as with most good things, there is more to the story 
than just positive innovation. 
As financial institutions continue to rely more on technology, new risks 
threaten our financial markets and its financial stability.6 Financial institutions 
are implementing new technology to keep up with the ongoing changes 
throughout the world. To stay competitive, they have begun looking for ways 
to increase speed and ease as new financial entities begin to emerge.7 At the 
forefront of efficiency technology is cloud computing.8 Cloud computing is a 
computing resource that is accessed via the internet and provides storage, 
networking, data management, and other services.9 Cloud computing benefits 
not only basic secondary functions, but it may be utilized for its core functions 
within financial services.10 
Various agencies that regulate the financial industry, however, still have 
                                                          
 4 See James McArthur, How Technology Has Changed Banking Industry Today?, 
ENGADGET (Oct. 19, 2016),  https://www.engadget.com/2016-10-19-how-technology-has-
changed-banking-industry-today.html (showing how banking has changed in six different 
ways due to technology). 
 5 See generally Lucy Gorham & Jess Dorrance, Catalyzing Inclusion: Financial 
Technology & The Underserved, CTR. FOR CMTY. CAP., UNIV. N.C. (Aug. 2017), 
https://communitycapital.unc.edu/files/2017/10/CCC-FinTech-Report-2017-1.pdf. 
 6 Memorandum from the U.S. House of Representatives’ Majority Staff of the Fin. 
Servs. Comm. to the Members of the Comm. on Fin. Servs. 2 (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA00/20191018/110094/HHRG-116-BA00-20191018-
SD002-U1.pdf [hereinafter “Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs.”] (detailing how the 
financial services was slower to adopt cloud computing and why); see also Edward Appert, 
Information Technology Risks in Financial Service, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/ 
us/en/pages/center-for-board-effectiveness/articles/information-technology-risks-financial-
services.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (highlighting some of the largest technological 
risks in the financial services). 
 7 Darryn Pollock, The Future of Banking: Is It All Bitcoin and Blockchain?, FORBES 
(July 25, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrynpollock/2019/07/25/the-future-of-
banking-is-it-all-bitcoin-and-blockchain/#475077231eb9 (outlining the changing market 
forces, which traditional banks will need to compete with near and long term). 
 8 BRAD CARR ET AL., INST. OF INT’L FIN., CLOUD COMPUTING IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
PART 1: AN ESSENTIAL ENABLER (Aug. 2018), https://www.iif.com/portals/0/Files/private/ 
32370132_cloud_computing_in_the_financial_sector_20180803_0.pdf. 
 9 Cloud Computing Basics, UNIV. OF WASH. INFO. TECH., https://itconnect.uw.edu/ 
research/cloud-computing-for-research/cloud-computing-basics/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2021). 
 10 CARR ET AL., supra note 8, at 1–3 (noting that cloud computing technology could 
“help firms expedite processes, reduce risks, and increase efficiency, as well as enhancing 
the ability to identify business opportunities and revenue streams”). 
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concerns about cloud computing technology despite its ability to improve 
consumer experience.11 Financial technology is quickly evolving, with 
minimal regulations to constraining it.12 Unlike past technological revolutions, 
society is more conscientious of changes within the financial industry.13 With 
its major institutions, such as Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, being 
deemed “too big to fail,” incorporating new technology within this industry 
with little regulation is troubling.14 Banks’ potential failures to successfully 
integrate technology puts the economy of the entire country at risk and could 
have a destructive impact on the acceptance of financial technology in the 
future. As a nation, we are risk averse to structural harm to our financial 
system, and financial technology (“FinTech”) has the potential to expose banks 
to such systemic risks.15 
This paper will focus on one aspect of financial technology: cloud service 
providers. It will explore the best way to manage this emerging technology as 
it relates to financial services and bank-related functions. To achieve this goal, 
it is imperative to define and understand: who cloud service provides are, what 
cloud computing is, and the potential regulations to be applied when used by 
financial institutions. Lastly, this comment will discuss the Financial Services 
Committee’s recent call to regulate cloud service providers as a systemically 
important financial market utility (“SIFMU”), potential alternative regulatory 
measures, and how they will either act as a benefit or detriment to the 
innovation of the technology.16 
                                                          
 11 Alan W. Avery et al., The Systemic Importance of Cloud-Based Service Providers to 
Banks, LATHAM & WATKINS L.L.P. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.fintechandpayments.com/ 
2019/09/the-systemic-importance-of-cloud-based-service-providers-to-banks/. 
 12 CARR ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (“The biggest challenge for migrating financial 
institutions’ data and applications to public cloud in a highly regulated environment is 
demonstrating to regulators that FIs are sufficiently competent to partner with CSPs. . .”). 
 13 Jesse McWaters, 5 Ways Technology is Transforming Finance, WORLD ECON. FORUM 
(June 30, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/5-ways-technology-
transforming-finance/ (discussing technology’s impact on the financial industry). 
 14 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 5; see also Too Big to Fail? 
Merging Bank of America and Merrill Lynch’s Cultures Risky, Analysts Say, WINSTON-
SALEM J. (Sept. 16, 2008), https://journalnow.com/business/too-big-to-fail-merging-bank-of-
america-and-merrill/article_091d04bb-b2a1-5b12-b988-9fa46515bb60.html (explaining 
how the two financial powerhouses merging could make “the nation’s largest financial-
services company – one that some believe is too big to fail.”). 
 15 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 5 (“As financial institutions 
migrate to cloud computing . . . . the operational risks increase, especially without the in-
depth regulator examination or guidelines. Operational risk refers to internal controls, 
people, systems, and external events, including cyber risks [e.g., data breaches, insufficient 
customer data backups, and operating system hijacking.]”). 
 16 Id. at 3–5. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. What is the Cloud? 
The “cloud” is broadly defined by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology as “a system for enabling efficient and on-demand access, 
regardless of location, to shared configurable resources that can be rapidly 
delivered to consumers with little management or oversight by a cloud 
provider.”17 Cloud computing is “the delivery of computing services— 
including servers, storage, databases, networking, software, analytics, and 
intelligence—over the internet (“the cloud”) to offer faster innovation, flexible 
resources, and economies of scale.”18 There are four major types of cloud 
deployments: public clouds, private clouds, community clouds, and hybrid 
clouds.19 Public clouds are defined as “a digital environment where the 
computing resources are available in a shared environment and accessed by 
multiple customers of the [cloud service providers].”20 Conversely, “private 
clouds provide computing resources dedicated to a single entity,” which can be 
more costly than a public cloud.21 Community clouds “are available for use by 
a specific community of users that have shared needs or concerns,” such as 
security and compliance.22 Lastly, “[h]ybrid [c]louds arrange a mix of 
deployments that enables quick data movability among different 
deployments.”23 Based on the financial institution’s cloud choice, the “nature 
and degree of control and risk” faced will vary.24 
Within each of these deployments are three main service implementations: 
                                                          
 17 Id. at 1. 
 18 What is Cloud Computing?, MICROSOFT AZURE, https://azure.microsoft.com/en-
us/overview/what-is-cloud-computing/ (last visited  Apr. 18, 2021). 
 19 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2. 
 20 Id.; see also What Is Public Cloud? 4 Basic Features of Public Cloud, CLOUDWAYS 
(Nov. 28, 2011), https://www.cloudways.com/blog/what-is-public (giving examples of a 
public cloud such as: “Amazon Elastic Cloud Compute, Google App Engine, Blue Cloud by 
IBM and Azure services Platform by Windows.”). 
 21 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2; see also Types of Cloud 
Computing: Private, Public, and Hybrid Clouds, U. OF ILL. TECH. SERVS., 
https://cloud.illinois.edu/types-of-cloud-computing-private-public-and-hybrid-clouds/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2021). 
 22 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2; see also Dejan Tucakov, 
What is Community Cloud? Benefits & Examples with Use Cases, PHOENIXNAP (Jun. 18, 
2020), https://phoenixnap.com/blog/community-cloud.https://phoenixnap.com/blog/ 
community-cloud. 
 23 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2; see also Types of Cloud 
Computing: Private, Public, and Hybrid Clouds, supra note 21. 
 24 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
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software as a service, platform as a service, and infrastructure as a service.25 
Software as a service (“SaaS”) “provides one or more software applications 
designed for specific purposes, typically vendor-managed and customizable by 
users.”26 Platform as a service (“PaaS”), also known as middleware, “is an 
application platform software (commonly referred to as middleware because it 
sits between the CSP and the customer) that provides customers flexibility to 
build and deploy custom applications using tools supported by [cloud service 
providers].”27 It is considered to be more flexible than SaaS but more 
structured than infrastructure as a service (“IaaS”) by enabling “the 
development and use of software by the customer on app[lication] hosting and 
development infrastructure offered by a cloud service provider.”28 Lastly, IaaS 
implementation, which is “known as the complete package for competing 
functionality, includes hardware, software, servers, and networking 
competing.”29 
B. Who are the Providers and What Benefits Do They Offer? 
Three of the largest IaaS providers are Azure, Google Cloud, and Amazon 
Web Services (“AWS”).30 When utilizing this form of a cloud service, the 
customer “does not manage or control the underlying cloud but has control 
over the operating systems.”31 This allows the customer to control “everything 
from the operating systems to the applications that run on that infrastructure.”32 
From start-ups to major financial institutions, firms are beginning to 
transition to the cloud due to their “expedite[d] processes, reduce[d] risks, and 
increase[d] efficiency[.]”33 Banking operations have become exceedingly 
complex and “proprietary data centers have become more expensive.”34 Cloud 
service providers allow their customers to utilize their services on an as-needed 
basis by permitting them to “automatically scale up when additional resources 
                                                          
 25 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2–3. 
 26 Id at 2; see also Tony Hou, IaaS vs PaaS vs SaaS Enter the Ecommerce Vernacular: 
What You Need to Know, Examples & More, BIGCOMMERCE, https://www.bigcommerce. 
com/blog/saas-vs-paas-vs-iaas/#executive-summary-summing-up-saas-vs-paas-vs-iaas (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2021). 
 27 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2–3; see also Hou, supra 
note 26. 
 28 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
 29 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2–3; see also Hou, supra 
note 26. 
 30 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 3. 
 31 Id. 
 32 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
 33 CARR ET AL., supra note 8, at 1. 
 34 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 6. 
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are needed and scale down when demand subsides.”35 This scaling process 
eliminates the need for “costly over-provisioning,” saving the institution 
money while increasing its efficiency.36 According to its chief technology 
officer, Microsoft Azure “continues to see strong Cloud adoption from the 
financial services industry, with more than 80 percent of the world’s largest 
banks and more than 75 percent of the global systemically important financial 
institutions using Azure.”37 As of 2018, “[80] percent of large financial 
institutions [have] adopt[ed] Azure.”38 Currently, “[AWS] have almost 50 
percent market share, followed by Azure, Google, IBM or Alibaba.”39 The 
overwhelming consensus is that clouds can increase efficiency in the industry 
unlike any other product, which has helped to sharpen the increase of financial 
institutions employing the technology.40 
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT ON FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
A. Cloud Service Implementation within the Financial Services Industry 
While the cloud is being utilized by large financial institutions, it currently 
provides periphery rather than core functions.41 The industry is slowly moving 
toward incorporating cloud services within its core functions, but it will likely 
continue its slow march to full incorporation because the technology used by 
financial institutions is complex.42 At present, “transactional core banking is 
highly integrated with legacy technologies, and regulation and internal 
governance are stricter around outsourcing and data privacy,” making financial 
institutions weary to adopt new IT programs.43 
                                                          
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Letter from Congresswoman Nydia M. Velazquez and Congresswoman Katie Porter 
to The Honorable Steven M. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 22, 
2019), https://velazquez.house.gov/sites/velazquez. 
house.gov/files/FSOC%20cloud%20.pdf [hereinafter “Letter to Sec’y Treasury”]. 
 38 Chad Morris, It’s Time for Financial Institutions to Adopt the Cloud – These 
Technologies Can Help, BIZTECH (Oct. 19, 2018), https://biztechmagazine.com/ 
article/2018/10/its-time-financial-institutions-adopt-cloud-these-technologies-can-help. 
 39 CARR ET AL., supra note 8, at 6. 
 40 Id. at 1, 3–4. 
 41 Id. at 1; SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 1 (explaining and listing the kinds of functions 
currently utilized by financial institutions: internal data information, human resources 
capabilities, email management, and app development). 
 42 CARR ET AL., supra note 8, at 2. 
 43 Id. 
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Yet, financial institutions are hard-pressed to adopt cloud technology 
because “financial institutions must (and are in the process to) adapt to a new 
reality, characterized by the customers’ expectations of immediacy and 
personalization.”44 Although cloud services are not currently integrated into 
the core services of financial institutions, the data that is maintained in the 
cloud is still critical to the operations of the financial institutions.45 Therefore, 
although governmental regulation is appropriate as financial institutions move 
to implement cloud services within their core functions, the urgency of the call 
may come too soon or too drastically, given institutions are not fast-tracking 
implementation. 
B. The Potential Impact on the Cloud and Congress’ Response 
The potential impact that these providers could have on financial 
institutions, and the market, have sparked a debate as how best to handle the 
emerging technology. Most recently, on August 22, 2019, Congresswomen 
Velazquez and Porter of the House Financial Services Committee (the 
“Congresswomen”) wrote a letter to the Secretary of the US Treasury 
Department to request that the Financial Services Oversight Committee 
(“FSOC”) consider designating the three leading providers of cloud service 
provider systems as systemically important financial market utilities 
(“SIFMUs”).46 Financial market utilities are defined by the Federal Reserve as 
“multilateral systems that provide the infrastructure for transferring, clearing, 
and settling payments, securities, and other financial transactions among 
financial institutions or between financial institutions and the system.”47 When 
determining whether a SIFMU designation is appropriate, the FSOC considers 
four factors: 
the aggregate monetary value of transactions processed by the 
financial market utility (“FMU”); the aggregate exposure of the 
[FMUs] to its counterparties; the relationship interdependencies, or 
other interactions of the [FMUs] with other [FMUs] or payment, 
clearing, or settlement activities; and the effect that the failure of or 
                                                          
 44 Id. at 3. 
 45 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. 
 46 Letter to Sec’y Treasury, supra note 37, at 1; see also Press Release, The Office of 
Congresswoman Nydia M. Velazquez, Velázquez, Porter Urge FSOC to Oversee Tech 
Giants 1 (Aug. 23, 2019), https://velazquez.house.gov/media-center/press-
releases/velazquez-porter-urge-fsoc-oversee-tech-giants (“The letter follows last month’s 
data breach at Capital One Financial Corporation, which exposed the personal information 
of approximately 106 million Capital One credit card customers and applicants.”). 
 47 Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last updated 
Jan. 29, 2015). 
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a disruption of the [FMUs] would have on critical markets, 
financial institutions, or the broader financial system.48 
Once a financial market utility is determined to be systemically important, 
the FSOC puts the organization or company on notice, holds hearings, allows 
for written submissions, and provides for consultations between the company 
or organization and the Federal Reserve.49 
Currently, there are eight institutions that have been designated as SIFMUs 
by the Federal Reserve.50 All of these have, even if not in their entirety, 
clearing house functions. A clearing house acts as an “intermediary between a 
buyer and seller” and seeks to ensure that the process from trade inception to 
settlement is smooth; its main role is to make certain that “the buyer and seller 
honor their contractual obligations.”51 Clearing houses are directly involved 
with the transaction or flow of currency, and their failure would be detrimental 
to the integrity of our financial markets.52 Their functions fall squarely within 
the four determining factors, and this implicitly necessitates the need for 
heightened regulation. 
However, designation as a SIFMU does not turn solely on whether or not 
the system falls squarely within the four factors. Authority over designation of 
financial market utilities further provides the FSOC with the authority to 
“place greater importance on whether the failure or disruption of the [financial 
market utility] would create or increase the risk of credit and liquidity issues 
among financial institutions and markets, and whether such credit and liquidity 
issues would threaten the stability of the US financial system.”53 This allows 
for a broad conception of what a SIFMU is and arguably opens the door to 
emerging market disrupters that have not traditionally been used in the 
financial sector. With this in mind, the members of the Committee on Financial 
Services have begun to explore the impact that cloud services could have on 
the US financial system, and if the threat posed is so great that it should be 
designated as a SIFMU.54 
                                                          
 48 Avery et al., supra note 11. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Designated Financial Market Utilities, supra note 47 (naming the eight institutions 
as: Clearing House Payments Company, L.L.C, CLS Bank International, Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, Inc., The Depository Trust Company, Fixed Income Clearing 
Corporation, ICE Clear Credit L.L.C, National Securities Clearing Corporation, and the 
Options Clearing Corporation). 
 51 Akhilesh Ganti, Clearinghouse, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/c/clearinghouse.asp (last updated Apr. 1, 2019). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Avery et al., supra note 11. 
 54 Memorandum to Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 2, 5. 
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III. WILL THE CLOUD END DATA BREACHES OR CREATE MORE 
CATASTROPHIC ONES? THE CASES OF EQUIFAX AND CAPITAL ONE 
A. The Tale of Equifax 
The internet and technology, as discussed above, have provided endless 
benefits for large companies to access consumers and their information; 
however, they have also created new risks for institutions and service providers 
that store information, as these large firms become enticing targets for cyber 
criminals.55 One example of an unlucky institution is Equifax. Equifax is a 
credit-reporting company that tracks and rates “the financial history of U.S. 
consumers.”56 In 2017, from May to July, Equifax suffered a data breach that 
compromised as many as 143 million US customers’ information (names, 
social security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and some driver’s licenses). 
Further, about 209,000 US customers’ credit card numbers were exposed; 
“personal identifying information” of roughly 182,000 US customers involved 
in credit report disputes was also released.57 This data breach was particularly 
unique, because not all customers were aware they were customers; instead, 
Equifax received its data from credit card companies, banks, retailers, and 
lenders who report the activity, “as well as by purchasing public records.”58 In 
the end, the company settled with affected customers for $700 million.59 This 
was one of the first big data breaches that demonstrated the potential harm that 
can be caused by a technological breach of an institution or corporation 
holding sensitive personal data. 
In response to this breach, Equifax is undergoing a technological and 
security makeover with cloud computing services at its center.60 It has chosen 
to partner with the Google Cloud Platform, which will enable Equifax to create 
a hierarchy of control.61 It has transitioned to this form of security based on the 
promise that “[i]f anything happens within any of those projects, each one is 
                                                          
 55 See What Makes Businesses a Target for Cybercrime?, NIC, https://www.nicitpartner. 
com/makes-businesses-target-cybercrime/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2021) (noting that smaller 
firms are currently the primary targets of choice for most cyberattacks, but that firms of 
larger sizes are now being targeted more frequently). 
 56 Sarah Ashley O’Brien, Giant Equifax Data Breach: 143 Million People Could be 
Affected, CNN BUS. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/07/technology/ 
business/equifax-data-breach/index.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Bridget Botelho, Equifax Shares ‘Risk Averse’ Cloud Security Model Post-Breach, 
TECHTARGET (Oct. 22, 2019), https://searchcloudcomputing.techtarget.com/news/ 
252472694/Equifax-shares-risk-averse-cloud-security-model-post-breach. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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essentially self-contained, so the scope [of a system compromise] is only 
extensive to that application[.]”62 By 2020, Equifax hopes to move its legacy 
mainframe and service technology to the public cloud.63 The senior officers of 
the corporation believe that transitioning Equifax’s data from traditional 
systems to a dual-cloud and physical security team program will rebuild the 
trust broken with consumers and ensure security.64 Although many regulators 
and consumers fear the use of the cloud will lead to more breaches, firms 
trying to guarantee security and information privacy are looking to the cloud as 
the solution to these problems. 
B. The Story of Capital One 
As the data breach of Equifax faded into the background, another data 
breach occurred at Capital One Financial Corporation in July 2019, which 
sparked a debate surrounding the potential harm that could be caused as other 
financial institutions implement cloud services.65 The hack of Capital One’s 
data “affected about 100 million U.S. customers, and 6 million Canadian 
clients . . . [a]bout 140,000 Social Security numbers and 80,000 linked bank 
account numbers were obtained through the breach[;] [b]ut Canadians were 
more heavily impacted, without about one million Social Insurance numbers 
compromised.”66 The majority of the information compromised included a 
“wide array of personal data, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, dates 
of birth, self-reported income, credit scores and fragments of transaction 
history.”67 
Fees and expenses to correct information system breaches can be significant, 
it is currently estimated that this breach will cost Capital One between $100 
million to $150 million in 2019.68 The breach occurred when information was 
                                                          
 62 Id. 
 63 Alex Hickey, Equifax Undergoing Major Tech Overhaul as Dust Settles from Breach 
Fallout, CIODIVE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ciodive.com/news/equifax-undergoing-
major-tech-overhaul-as-dust-settles-from-breach-fallout/549154/. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Letter to Sec’y Treasury, supra note 37, at 1; see also Memorandum to Comm. on 
Fin. Servs., supra note 6, at 5 (both the letter and the memorandum for the October 18, 
2019, meeting discuss the potential harm that could occur if another institution’s data is 
compromised as it was with Capital One). 
 66 Lucinda Shen, Capital One’s Data Breach Could Cost the Company up to $500 
Million, FORTUNE (July 31, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/07/31/capital-one-data-breach-
2019-paige-thompson-settlement/. 
 67 Christian Berthelsen et al., Capital One Says Breach Hit 100 Million Individuals in 
U.S., BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-
29/capital-one-data-systems-breached-by-seattle-woman-u-s-says. 
 68 Shen, supra note 66. 
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illegally accessed by one of Amazon’s former cloud-service employees.69 
However, it has been confirmed, and accepted, that the breach was not due to 
any vulnerability on the part of the Amazon Web Services systems, but rather 
an additional firewall that was protecting one of its applications.70 Initially, 
Capital One was one of the leading advocates for the use of cloud services 
within banks, with a plan to completely migrate its data centers by the end of 
2020.71 Because of the disastrous breach and the potential for others in the 
future, it begs the question of whether other firms should reconsider moving to 
the cloud, or if it is unfair to place such a burden or pressure on the system that 
was ruled not to have caused the breach. Although the result of this breach had 
a wide impact, especially on retail consumers and small businesses, it has been 
instructive in identifying and understanding the pitfalls of cloud services.72 The 
regulators and larger financial institutions can learn from this incident how best 
to mitigate and remediate potential incidents like this so that they do not 
happen in the future. 
IV. DESIGNATION OF CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS AS 
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL MARKET UTILITIES 
A. Where Does FSOC’s Authority Derive From? 
If cloud service providers fall under the SIFMU, they become subject to 
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).73 On July 21, 2010, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was implemented “to mitigate systemic risk in the financial 
system and to promote financial stability, in part, through enhanced 
supervision of financial market utilities.”74 More commonly, it has been 
referred to as the body of law that regulates institutions that are “too big to 
fail.”75 Too-big-to-fail institutions are financial firms “that would crash the 
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entire financial system and global economy if they failed.”76 In 2008, in order 
to avoid another economic meltdown like the Great Depression, the 
government bailed out financial institutions such as JP Morgan Chase, 
Citigroup, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley.77 In a similar process to the 
designation of SIFMUs, regulatory bodies execute their oversight authority by 
designating firms as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“SIFIs”).78 
The policy aim behind designating these institutions is to recognize the 
influence over the market and the financial sector.79 The FSOC is tasked with 
analyzing which institutions and organizations pose such a threat.80 Once an 
institution is recognized as such an entity, a specific regulatory body is 
assigned to oversee it, usually the Federal Reserve or the Treasury.81 Oversight 
of these institutions is conducted in order to ensure the stability of the market 
and its institutions, but also on a more fundamental level, the policy ensures 
consumer trust in the institution itself.82 Dodd-Frank arose from a time of 
uncertainty where consumers and investors did not trust the financial 
industry.83 The regulations and designations work to rebuild and foster trust 
between financial institutions and consumers. As will be discussed next, the 
Congresswomen of the Financial Oversight Committee believe cloud service 
providers’ products have the potential to disrupt this policy and could lead to 
distrust, or worse a financial disaster.84 
V. APPLICATION OF THE SIFMU FACTORS 
As mentioned above, a financial market utility is considered a SIFMU when 
it satisfies the four factors relating to transactions and its relationship to the 
market, institutions, and the system overall; however, these factors are not met 
by the services provided by cloud service systems.85 
As to the first factor, which considers the aggregate monetary value of 
transactions processed by the FMU in the financial service context of cloud 
computing and service providers, the systems do not provide services for 
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processing transactions.86 Even in the Congresswomen’s memorandum, they 
note that “cloud service providers do not directly process monetary 
transactions,” yet they maintain that, “their operational stability still underpins 
a large portion of banks’ central functions.”87 They further argue that due to 
the fact that “[b]anks and other financial institutions use cloud-based service 
providers to connect to one another and to other market participants, [this] 
enables monetary and commercial transactions while also maintaining 
sensitive information regarding their clients.”88 The Congresswomen’s 
argument tries to stretch the functions of the cloud services to fit within this 
first factor, but it is grounded in their view of the future.89 They fear that while 
“cloud service providers may not process monetary transactions like SIFMUs, 
these firms provide the world’s biggest banks with the technological 
foundation necessary to link to one another and other financial and commercial 
market participants, thereby helping to enable monetary and commercial 
transactions while simultaneously maintaining their clientele’s most sensitive 
information and associated assets.”90 The Congresswomen fully recognize that 
the categorization is tenuous, but they provide a preemptive warning to the 
Secretary of the Treasury that within the next several years, institutions will 
begin to transition their platforms to the technology.91 However, general 
congressional oversight does not always inform regulation but can serve to 
deter innovation. 
The current participation of cloud service systems in the transaction process 
cannot be generalized to equate to a system where the aggregate monetary 
value of transactions is processed.92 It is too far of a stretch. Although it is 
concerning that financial institutions are storing large volumes of data on the 
cloud and relying on their servers for data storage, this does not cause them to 
fall within this first factor.93 For example, The Clearing House Payments 
Company (“CHIPS”) was designated as an SIFMU on May 22, 2012.94 It 
qualified under the first factor based on “the degree to which the U.S. banking 
system relies on CHIPS to facilitate significant financial flows, particularly 
those involving transfers between U.S. money center banks and foreign banks 
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operating in the United States.”95 The transfers are not only high profile, but 
every two weeks, “the value of payments settling through CHIPS . . . [is the] 
equivalent to the gross domestic product of the United States.”96 
Likewise, another SIFMU designee, CLS Bank International, was found to 
fulfill the first factor based on its settlement volumes and values, which had 
“an average aggregate daily value of $4.77 trillion in 2011.”97 Both firms deal 
with a significant volume of U.S. transactions on a daily basis.98 The failure of 
one of these firms would not only pose a risk to market stability, but such a 
failure could also foster distrust between consumers, the market, and its 
institutions, which are the kind of firms SIFMU designations are meant to 
regulate.99 Cloud services are not intended to provide the valuable functions 
CHIPS and CLS Bank provide. This does not mean they never will, but until 
financial institutions move in that direction, it is hard to align the functions of 
cloud services with the vital functions of other SIFMUs. Therefore, cloud 
service providers do not meet the requirements for the first factor. 
As to the second factor, the aggregate exposure to counterparties, the 
Congresswomen recognize the lack of financial exposure in the event of a 
cloud failure but argue that “the operational losses stemming from such a cloud 
failure could be significant.”100 Their phrasing of these concerns appears dire, 
but their argument fails to provide the factual support to meet the requirements 
for the second factor. This is due to the fact that such exposure is unlikely to 
occur.101 One of the core reasons for institutions to switch to the cloud is the 
system’s redundancy measures.102 The redundancy capabilities used by the 
cloud are the most cost effective and get businesses back up and running faster 
than current legacy systems.103 As a result, the cloud has been championed as a 
more secure alternative to other similar programs.104 Moreover, as many have 
argued, with multiple layers and firewalls, the most problematic scenario is 
significantly less likely to occur.105 
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Although the Congresswomen do not reference the Capital One breach, it is 
worth mentioning for risk purposes. As stated above, the breach was not due to 
its use of cloud services per se, but rather, it resulted from a firewall created by 
Capital One and not AWS; however, it is arguable that due to the consolidation 
by the cloud, it allowed the hacker greater access than would have been 
possible on servers that do not keep everything under one umbrella.106 For 
arguments sake, a technology that allows its clients to build on top of the cloud 
creates complications that the provider can neither plan for, nor detect or 
predict to happen.107 This could lead hackers to steal more than just 
information by gaining access to the institution’s core functions. Although this 
is a stretch, the Congresswomen would likely argue that a coordinated attack 
could capitalize on a resulting data breach and generate the significant damage 
necessary to be considered an institutional risk event. However, this is again a 
hypothetical and must be weighed against the potentially stifling effects a 
SIFMU designation will have on innovation. 
The characteristics of firms currently designated as SIFMU’s differ from the 
actual working profile of the cloud service providers with respect to the second 
factor. For example, the National Securities Clearing House (“NSCC”) 
“manages or operates a multilateral system for the purpose of clearing and 
settling securities transactions among financial institutions and between 
financial institutions and NSCC.”108 The NSCC steps in if a seller is unable to 
procure a security, and the clearing house acts as a way of bailing it out. In 
2011, “NSCC’s peak daily liquidity exposure to a single counterparty [was] 
$13 billion.”109 Further, the NSCC is “required to contribute up to 25 percent 
of its retained earnings in the event the clearing fund and other collateral is not 
sufficient to cover a loss.”110 
Unlike cloud service systems, a disruption caused to the NSCC, and other 
institutions like it, has the potential to disrupt the market and cause market 
participants to lose faith in the system if the NSCC is unable to meet its 
obligations.111 The failure of organizations like NSCC would not be an 
operational loss but could create untold market instability; therefore, FSOC 
was correct in designating the NSCC as a SIFMU because of the potential 
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ramifications the disruption of this organization would have to its counterparts 
and the stability of the markets overall.112 Conversely, cloud service providers 
do not inherently share NSCC’s risk profile, and therefore the second factor is 
not met. 
As to the third factor—the relationship, interdependencies, or other 
interactions of the financial market utility with other financial market utilities 
or payment, clearing, or settlement activities113—the Congresswomen urged 
the Secretary of the Treasury to recognize the importance of developing and 
enforcing “appropriate safeguards to protect against the possibility of a bank 
run in the event that a data breach were to negatively impact the public’s 
confidence in cloud-based services and subsequently deter use of cloud-reliant 
banks.”114 The Congresswomen emphasized that “[s]hould any cloud service 
provider fail, public mistrust of the service would not be limited to that one 
company.”115 However, they concluded their analysis by reiterating that it is 
the speed of the technological development that requires enforcing safeguards 
in order to maintain continued acceptance of the cloud.116 Again, this is to 
assume that a data breach is likely to be caused by a lack of security measures 
within the cloud, which has not been demonstrated to be true; and even in 
Capital One’s case, Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) was not determined to be 
at fault.117 
Although their analysis demonstrates the potential fallout from a breach of 
the cloud,118 the FSOC has traditionally found institutions to satisfy this third 
factor based on the extent of interdependence between the institutions and 
other “payment, clearing, or settlement activities.”119 For example, the Options 
Clearing Corporation’s (“OCC”) operations “involve significant 
interdependence between OCC, other [financial market utilities], settlement 
banks, clearing members, credit facility lenders, custodians, exchanges, cross-
margining entities and pricing vendors.”120  The clearing houses rely on one 
another if, for instance, a member of the multilateral cross-guaranty agreement 
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defaults.121 If this occurs, the members will share in the residual proceeds to 
restore balance between clearing houses with excess profit and those in a 
“shortfall position.”122 This kind of relationship illustrates how the current 
financial market utilities work together and how an impact on one of them 
would have a domino effect upon the others. 
Instead of demonstrating the similarity between the interdependence of the 
cloud with other financial market utilities, the Congresswomen relied on the 
argument that the use of the technology in financial institutions alone could 
create problems for other financial market utilities.123 However, although a 
potential breach could cause consumers to mistrust the system, the use of the 
same technology and its failure by one is unlikely to deter consumers from 
using all financial institutions. Society has already witnessed a cloud 
information breach, and it has not caused a “bank run” even from the offending 
financial institution.124 Still, this is hypothetical where the designation of 
institutions such as OCC clearly demonstrates the intricate relationships 
between it and other financial market utilities, where the relationship is so 
closely knit that there is a unique reliance and a need for maintaining each of 
the other like institutions. This interlinked relationship is not present with 
cloud services, and therefore, it explains why they do not fit within the third 
category. 
Lastly, with respect to the fourth factor, “the Congresswomen highlighted 
the potentially catastrophic effects of disruption to the cloud . . . [considering] 
the dependence on cloud-based services not only by all financial institutions in 
some capacity but also by various government agencies,” thereby not only 
threatening “the financial industry but also government functions and national 
security.”125 In their letter, they cited a 2016 report by McKinsey, stating that 
“100 percent of financial institutions use cloud services in some capacity[,] 
[and] our government has come to rely on Amazon Web Services for a massive 
share of its data storage needs[.]”126 Currently, “the Department of Defense 
holds a $10 billion cloud computing contract with Amazon Web Services, and 
NASA and the state of Arizona are also clients of [Amazon Web Services.]”127 
As financial institutions and government agencies begin to incorporate the 
cloud into their technologies, disruption to a cloud service provider could 
potentially debilitate not only the financial industry but also government 
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functions and our national security.128 
This argument is analogous to the reasons for designating other SIFMUs.129 
As mentioned above, CLS Bank satisfied the fourth factor because a failure or 
disruption to it “may reduce FX market activity and the flow of funds in US 
and foreign financial markets and to the broader economy.”130 To disrupt the 
flow of funds in the US or foreign financial markets would have clear 
ramifications on financial institutions and the economy as a whole.131 
Similarly, the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) was found to meet the 
criteria for the fourth factor because of the devastating impact that would occur 
if it were to fail.132 The ramifications of such an event could potentially lead to 
“spillover effects on the rest of the U.S. economy, [a reduced] amount of credit 
available generally, [a reduced] value of household savings and corporate 
reserves, affecting the financing activities of corporations, destabilizing U.S. 
money market funds, and reducing the availability of secured credit.”133 Such 
events would lead to financial instability and potentially raise concerns for the 
country’s national security. These potential domino fallouts are similar to the 
concerns the Congresswomen addressed in their letter.134 The overall potential 
disruption to our financial markets, coupled with the effect on basic 
government functions, is similar to the potential financial market and 
institutional disruption that the FSOC evaluates when designating an institution 
or third-party as a SIFMU.135 Like the case of CLS Bank, if as a result of its 
own use of the cloud there is a disruption that leads to government concern that 
its data information is at risk based on a breach within the financial services 
industry, then such an event could lead the agency or institution to quickly 
transfer its platform for fear of a breach itself.136 Therefore, this single factor 
regarding the effects of potential cloud disruption provides one of the strongest 
arguments in favor of the Congresswomen’s position that cloud service 
providers should be designated as SIFMUs.137 
Finally, the FSOC may, instead of considering all of the factors equally, 
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determine “whether the failure or disruption of the [financial market utility] 
would create or increase the risk of credit and liquidity issues among financial 
institutions and markets, and whether such credit and liquidity issues would 
threaten the stability of the US financial system.”138 At this moment, there are 
three cloud service providers dominating the industry: Azure, Google Cloud, 
and AWS, which creates a lack of substitutability.139 This, coupled with the 
inability to quickly transfer from one service provider to another if one should 
fail, creates a systemic risk.140 
This is the Congresswomen’s overall strongest argument because it speaks 
to the future ramifications. Rather than the actual function of the technology, 
this last factor is more concerned with its potential disruptive nature.141 This 
characteristic of the cloud is likely what pushed the Congresswomen to bring 
the issue forward. And they’re not alone in their plight for some form of 
regulation; “[w]orld financial market regulators share the concerns regarding 
the ramifications of cloud-based disruption or failure on financial institutions 
and markets.”142 As these cloud-based technologies have improved and 
become prevalent in a wide-range of industries, governments around the world 
are struggling with how to manage them and the unknown consequences of 
their use.143 It should be noted that data collected by Morpheus Data found 
“that the total time lost from cloud outages of the 3 top [cloud service 
providers] in 2017 was an aggregate of just 16 hours across all industries, not 
just financial institutions.”144 This fact should give significant comfort to 
governments and market participants alike that the largest cloud service 
providers are carefully monitoring the greatest risks of market disruption and 
creating multiple levels of controls to ensure their systems work as designed. 
In February 2019, the Financial Stability Board “noted that technology 
could upend the stability of the financial markets.”145 In further support of the 
Congresswomen’s position, the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory 
Authorities issued a report to the European Commission in April 2019, which 
stated that cloud “computing services are central to financial institutions and 
highlight the vulnerabilities of the financial industry’s reliance on cloud 
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services.”146 Although regulatory bodies around the world are aware of the 
potential implications of cloud services, they are still unable to determine the 
best regulation without stifling potentially beneficial innovation.147 
While there is international and domestic consensus that there is reason to be 
concerned by unregulated cloud service providers, the FSOC would need to 
determine that emergency conditions exist before designation should occur.148 
Currently, no emergency conditions apply.149 The functions that the 
Congresswomen fear most have not been transitioned to the cloud.150 It is 
inevitable that they will be, but the industry is being as cautious as possible, 
because likewise, it does not want to do anything that would disrupt the 
market. As noted above, it will be a slow and strategic process transitioning 
transaction functions to the cloud. Therefore, it is not necessary to jump the 
gun by regulating them under a designation that does not fit. 
If these emergency conditions do not apply, institutions argue that there are 
other regulatory practices that are and have always been in place to deal with 
the unknown risks that come with cloud services.151 The least intrusive way to 
evaluate the cloud service provider risk is to expand guidance on it, while 
developing and learning from the providers and other countries grappling with 
the same dilemma; however, the answer cannot be found in applying an ill-
fitting designation for lack of an obvious alternative. 
VI. IF THE SHOE DOES NOT FIT, WHAT ARE THE OTHER OPTIONS? 
If this technology is going to become common place in a wide variety of 
industries, it is unrealistic to leave it unregulated. “[E]ven though the use of the 
cloud by financial institutions is currently limited, it can expand very fast and 
become critical infrastructure in the near future,” making it imperative for the 
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government and providers to get on the same page.152 Rather than shoehorn the 
cloud into a regulatory framework that does not fit its unique qualities, the 
government should consider other alternatives, such as: pursuing a multi-
vendor strategy, allowing banks to apply their current regulatory and 
compliance requirements, or following the European Bank Authority by 
creating new regulatory measures to fit this evolving technology.153 
One of the fundamental risks faced by institutions using cloud service 
providers is the potential for cloud failure or other “operational risks.”154 
Although clouds have not faced lengthy fail or down periods in the past, this 
does not mean that it is impossible.155 The process of using the cloud creates a 
single point of failure, which could pose substantial risks to financial and 
governmental stability; therefore, implementing a multi-vendor strategy would 
ensure that there is “no one key cloud provider for any given [financial 
institution].”156 If the government or institutions can work with cloud providers 
to draw from one another and ensure an immediate back-up if one service fails, 
then it would guarantee that disruption to one provider would not be 
detrimental to the stability of the entire system.157 Instead, the institution could 
rely on the other cloud service while the failed provider works to bring the 
servers back online.158 
This system would promote stability and competition, but it requires an 
increase in cloud firms.159 Presently, there are a limited number of major cloud 
service providers with Amazon Web Services making up almost 50 percent of 
the market share, followed by Azure, Google, IBM, and Alibaba.160 To 
properly implement a multi-vendor system, more firms must enter the existing 
market. Hopefully, as more institutions relocate their data to these servers, new 
providers will enter the market and can act as complements, or back-ups, to the 
leading firms.161 However, given this solution is premised on more firms 
entering the market, it is not necessarily the safest route for institutional 
stability.162 It may be more realistic to consider this as an option in the future, 
depending on how quickly financial institutions transition their functions to the 
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cloud. It should be recognized as an option if firms are unwilling to deal with 
strict government regulations. 
The second alternative is to allow banks and financial institutions to 
negotiate regulatory and risk applications with cloud service providers. Banks 
and financial institutions are already governed by regulatory and compliance 
obligations.163 These obligations have historically, and currently, apply to any 
third-party vendor or contractor that the institutions employ.164 This is the 
largest challenge firms must face: to demonstrate to regulators “that financial 
institutions are sufficiently competent to partner with [cloud service providers] 
in the understanding and management of the risks and migration to (and 
operation in) the cloud.”165 When a financial institution enters into an 
agreement with a third-party for an important, new, or existing function or 
service, it must “undergo a strict risk assessment and due diligence of the 
provider[.]”166 For instance, some banks “have adopted the policy of not 
moving any material workload to a public cloud provider that increases their 
risk profile, meaning that their use of cloud is net neutral in terms of risk.”167 
Furthermore, financial regulators require financial institutions to audit a 
service they have outsourced, which requires access to the provider’s premises, 
devices, systems, networks, and data involved for providing the service.168 
Financial institutions are not only required to perform some form of audit, but 
they are also further required to establish the right of their governing regulators 
to audit the cloud service provider.169 
The two governing laws of cloud service providers are the Bank Service 
Company Act ( “BSCA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ( “GLBA”).170 
The BSCA provides federal banking agencies with “the authority to examine 
and regulate the activities, functions, and operations performed by third-party 
service providers to the same extent as if they were performed by the bank 
itself.”171 Under the Dodd Frank Act, the Consumer Financial Protection 
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Bureau (“CFPB”) has the authority “to review service providers’ operations 
and initiate enforcement actions against both a bank and its service provider 
for violations of any law[.]”172 Although the CFPB’s job is primarily to 
oversee the financial institutions, guidance released by the agency warns third-
party vendors that “they have an independent obligation to comply with all 
laws, regulations, and guidance that their counterparty banks are subject to, 
with no allowance or concessions provided for failing to fully understand these 
requirements, even where the bank customer fails to.”173 This regulation 
provides the CFPB with the authority to oversee cloud service providers when 
they act as third-party vendors to banks.174 Although it is not a direct allocation 
of oversight power, it still requires some accountability from service providers 
to meet the same regulatory standards as the financial institutions.175 
Furthermore, Section 503 of the GLBA requires a financial institution to 
describe its “policies and practices with respect to collecting and disclosing 
nonpublic personal information about a consumer to both affiliated and 
nonaffiliated third parties.”176 The Act further requires the institution to allow 
its consumers to “opt-out” of their information being shared with third-party 
vendors.177 Indirectly, this would require cloud service providers to provide 
information on its security and information-sharing policies so that the 
institution could fulfill its obligation under the GLBA.178 Like the BSCA, this 
would generate some accountability from the cloud service provider just by 
entering into a contract with a financial institution as a third-party vendor. 
As such, although the government prefers stricter regulation for cloud 
service providers, there already is some in place.179 By allowing financial 
institutions and cloud service providers the ability to govern the audit and 
oversight of their service contract, they can apply the already existing 
regulations as they fit with their special relationship.180 There are many 
functions of the cloud, and given much of the technology is still evolving or 
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being integrated to financial institutions’ core functions, it is hard to say now 
which exactly apply for the specific software or cloud being used by that 
institution. If the government continues to hold financial institutions 
accountable for auditing and oversight of their third-party contractors, then this 
should constitute sufficient regulation until core functions or new functions 
become integrated. 
However, it has been asserted that “the relationship between financial 
institutions and public cloud providers is fundamentally different from 
traditional outsourcing relationship[s] – financial institutions that use the 
public cloud share computing resources with thousands, if not millions of other 
customers located across multiple jurisdictions.”181 This may mean that it will 
be impossible to treat cloud service providers like other third-party vendors by 
applying the existing regulations.182 If this is truly the case, the government 
may need to reassess its playbook entirely. 
If the two aforementioned solutions are too weak, or rely too heavily on 
potential future developments, it is instead possible to look to other countries 
around the world that are dealing with this conundrum and that are applying 
new techniques to address cloud regulation.183 The European Bank Authority 
has introduced “the possibility of exercising those audits and access rights by 
using any of the following means: pooled audits organized jointly with other 
clients of the same cloud service provider and performed by these clients or by 
a third-party appointment by them, third-party certifications, and third-party or 
internal audit reports made available by the cloud service provider.”184 This 
approach has been regarded as more flexible compared to others and “has the 
benefit of increasing the efficiency of this process, likely raising the average 
quality of auditing while also reducing the burden of both the [financial 
institutions] and the [cloud service providers].”185 
 If a more flexible approach is still too lenient a measure, and the 
government finds it is in their best interest to apply stricter regulations, it 
should still take note of its allies’ actions.186 For example, the European 
Commission has initiated a joint approach to work with groups on cloud 
switching, porting data, and on cloud-security certification.187 These groups are 
“co-chaired by representatives from the cloud service industry and from 
business users of cloud services to ensure a necessary balanced approach to 
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this work.”188 It may seem trivial, but conversations between regulators, 
financial institutions, and cloud service providers would provide the most 
holistic approach to determining the best frameworks, programs, and processes 
to increase the use of cloud services and address the associated risks.189 It 
could also alleviate some of the animosity between the aforementioned parties, 
so that each feels like they are walking away with a fair deal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The SIFMU designation is the not the correct designation for cloud service 
providers. Although there is room for potential disruption from these 
providers, they do not fit within any of the current taxonomical factors for 
SIFMU designation. At present, such designation would only be fitting given 
an emergency situation. Currently, there are regulatory and oversight measures 
in place or moderate regulatory practices that could be put in place. The 
superior system of oversight would be a process of regulatory engagement and 
supervision with new financial technology firms. Specifically, a real-time 
engagement of government examiners as the systems are being built is a 
preferred approach to integrating financial technology firms with the more 
heavily regulated financial institutions. Through open channels of 
communication between institutions, financial technology firms, and 
regulators, parties can share best practices throughout the industry. This would 
create an environment that would hopefully demonstrate to regulators that the 
best security and privacy measures are being implemented throughout this new 
critical industry. 
There is not a government in the world that does not recognize that financial 
institutions are moving swiftly to integrate cloud systems and the potential 
risks that come with it. Rather than forcing a designation that does not clearly 
fit, the government should create a separate regulatory body for cloud service 
providers. Providers’ services are unique in themselves and in what they 
provide to their clients. Providers do not fall naturally into any existing US 
regulatory designations. If the government does not feel that financial 
institutions can perform suitable oversight, then it will need to create a 
specialized body that can. 
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